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Who is gaffr?
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gaffr is the best way to analyse the beautiful game, share football opinions and collaborate on team selection.
Soon, you’ll be able to flex your football management skills and assemble the team that you think should be fielded in upcoming fixtures. Just like fantasy football? Not really - gaffr is not about competition at all, it’s a way of sharing your ideas about football tactics and team selection, comparing strategy with others and collaborating to produce a great team.
But that’s just the start! At its heart, gaffr is an online network where your team is the focus of attention, not your profile. You’ll be able to link up with people who share similar football management ideas to you, discuss your own and others’ teams, and add your influence to the team calculated by all gaffr users through a unique aggregation process.
If you enjoy unpicking the details of soccer managers’ decisions, you’ll want to join up with gaffr and indulge that passion to the full.
gaffr will be launching soon!
Mark @ April 18, 2008
Coventry, Retrospective, Tottenham
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The 1987 FA Cup is widely regarded to have produced one of the classic Cup Finals. An overachieving Coventry City lined up against a talented Tottenham Hotspur side.
Overview
During the 1986/87 season Tottenham, under manager David Pleat, played free-flowing football facilitated by a five-man midfield: they did not deviate from this style for the Cup Final. With Glenn Hoddle, the playmaker, as the most advanced midfielder it could be considered that Tottenham played a 4-4-1-1 formation. However, flexibility underpinned Pleat’s approach and the players’ roles overlapped a great deal and they often switched positions over the course of a game. Therefore, despite fielding just one forward, the prolific Clive Allen, this was an approach predicated on attacking football. Ossie Ardiles sat the deepest of the midfielders during the final, breaking up attacks and initiating many of Tottenham’s moves. Paul Allen sat level with Ardiles in central midfield for the early exchanges, but advanced more as the game progressed.
Perennial strugglers Coventry had enjoyed a good season in the league which was complemented by an impressive cup run. Coventry fielded a traditional 4-4-2 employing Keith Houchen at the target man next to fellow forward Cyrille Regis. Tough tackling Lloyd McGrath was allocated the task of marking Glenn Hoddle so sat deeper than his fellow central midfielder, the busy Michael Gynn. For this fixture Coventry’s 4-4-2 thus resembled 4-1-3-2. Midfielder David Phillips dropped to right-back to cover for the injured Brian Borrows. 
The game
Before the game had settled Tottenham stole an early lead which intimated that this could be a one-sided affair. Chris Waddle turned Coventry left-back Greg Downs and delivered a cross from the right; Clive Allen met it first and headed past Steve Ogrizovic. Coventry rose to the occasion, however, and did not let the early goal crush them. Houchen’s aerial presence caused Gary Mabbutt and Richard Gough problems and Coventry prevented Tottenham from dominating. Coventry pulled the game level just seven minutes after they had conceded. Downs’s cross from deep was flicked on by Houchen; right-midfielder Dave Bennett stole in ahead of a static Tottenham defence and finished deftly past Ray Clemence.
Coventry were perhaps also unlucky to have a goal ruled out on 20 minutes: Regis’s header was disallowed as Houchen was adjudged to have pushed Gough, but the contact was slight. After half-an-hour of the game Spurs were hitting their stride and with the five-man midfield combining well, they were able to retain possession and stretch Coventry. However, Tottenham’s expansive approach did leave them prone to counterattacks. During this passage of play Waddle was dispossessed on the edge of the Coventry area; Coventry broke and were faced with a threadbare Tottenham defence; Regis slid the ball through to Gynn but his shot was saved by Clemence. Tottenham did manage to take the lead again though before half-time. A free-kick delivered by Hoddle from the right was spooned into the net from the edge of the six-yard box. The goal was credited to Mabbutt but on reflection it appears to come off Coventry defender Brian Kilcline.
Both sides continued to attack in the second-half and had further chances to score. For Coventry, Gynn was played through by Kilcline but was denied by a Gough tackle. At the other end, Clive Allen turned adroitly in the box but was crowded out by Peake and Downs before he could get his shot away. Just after the hour mark this open game yielded a further goal. A long-ball from Ogrizovic was flicked on by Cyrille Regis, Houchen played the ball out to Bennett, Bennett crossed and Houchen, continuing his run, finished with a diving header. With the score now at 2-2 both sides had opportunities to win the game within normal time, but Tottenham perhaps threatened the most. Clive Allen was arguably isolated a little during this game without a strike-partner, but when he received the ball in the box he was always dangerous. On 80 minutes he just failed to convert a Hodge cross whilst under pressure from Kilcline. And then with two minutes to go in normal time, Allen made space for himself but could only shoot against Ogrizovic’s legs from a tight angle.
The game opened up even more in extra-time but it was Coventry that managed the breakthrough. Substitute Graham Rodger broke from defence and fed McGrath on the right; McGrath’s cross caught Mabbutt’s knee and looped over Clemence to make it 3-2 to Coventry. In the second period of extra-time Tottenham did not look likely to draw level. Perhaps the fluid five-man midfield was not equipped to carry a team through 120 minutes as Tottenham seemed more weary than Coventry. Waddle in particular appeared to be labouring in a more central position. Pleat brought Nico Claesen on to join the attack and even Gough advanced to provide an aerial option. Hoddle moved back in the endeavour to influence play from deeper, but it was to no avail and if anything Coventry threatened more. An interception by Dave Bennett just inside the Tottenham half allowed him to send Gynn through, but the latter failed to round Clemence. Coventry then held on comfortably for a deserved and famous victory; their first major trophy in their 104 year history.
In conclusion
Coventry perhaps did not display the sophistication of Tottenham over this final, but there was more to Coventry’s game than route one football. They battled very hard but also engaged in some lively and well coordinated attacking play of their own. What is apparent, on reflection, is how much ground both sides covered. Tottenham did adopt a flexible approach but players for both sides assumed positions which appeared contrary to their allocated roles. It may have been that man-marking was adopted over a zonal approach. At times even full-backs ended up on the opposite side of the pitch from their regular positions. It is also interesting that neither side had much penetration on the left. Steve Hodge seldom advanced down his flank for Tottenham to test makeshift right-back Dave Phillips. Meanwhile Coventry’s left-midfielder Nick Pickering had very little attacking presence and did not advance to the Tottenham goal-line throughout the game. Pickering however was somewhat waylaid with defensive duties. Waddle was a handful for Downs so the left-back required support, and whenever Paul Allen broke from midfield it was usually down this flank as Tottenham tried to make the most of their extra midfielder.
Coventry’s stalwart defender Trevor Peake became increasingly commanding as the game progressed after a couple of shaky first-half moments, and he needed to be at the top of his game to thwart Clive Allen. McGrath and Gynn were also crucial and battled hard throughout to contain Hoddle and the other Tottenham midfielders. Hoddle’s influence was significantly curtailed by the close attentions of McGrath and this limited the efficacy of Pleat’s five-man midfield. While Tottenham attacked freely at times it must be noted that the only goal they scored from open play was two minutes into the game. Therefore, whilst both sides could have won this entertaining and open fixture, nobody could begrudge the hardworking and spirited Coventry their moment of glory.
Edward @ April 17, 2008
England, Retrospective
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Fabio Capello tested two formations against France but neither approach managed to prompt any attacking ideas from the England players. In the first-half England adopted a 4-2-3-1 approach and, despite conceding a penalty, perhaps shaded the first 45 minutes. They enjoyed significant periods of territorial advantage and retained possession well. The team performance was not imbued with a great deal of creativity but the players linked up well enough and a couple of half-chances were generated. Owen Hargreaves and Gareth Barry were situated at the base of midfield and provided a sound platform for the rest of the team. The full-backs Wes Brown and Ashley Cole were thus quite visible on the overlap. England easily measured up to France in the first-half but it was difficult to envisage from where a clear goalscoring chance would originate.
France also had very little cutting edge; however, they demonstrated that one breakthrough can be devastating with a forward such as Anelka in the frontline. Clerc slipped the attentions of the otherwise resilient Hargreaves and played through Anelka whose pace took him away from John Terry; Anelka was brought down by David James in the area and Ribery converted the spot-kick.
I would persist with 4-2-3-1 for future fixtures as it appeared a well organized unit. What is required is more impact from the advanced midfielders. Steven Gerrard exerted little influence and Joe Cole had one of his less impressive games. Beckham worked hard on the right and some of his distribution was excellent, but his limitations are well documented and he is unlikely to get past his marker. This does not mean that these players cannot be accommodated under this formation, but highlights that the advanced midfield line should be supplemented by a player (or players) with more pace or attacking verve. For example, Beckham had a good final season for Real Madrid under a Capello-organized 4-2-3-1, but he was accompanied in midfield by Raul and Robinho.
Wayne Rooney toiled upfront in this fixture but had little service. He plays the lone forward role well for Man Utd, who currently lead the English Premier League, so he is well equipped for this position. However, Man Utd have an abundance of goalscoring midfielders and England do not have someone with Cristiano Ronaldo’s attacking presence situated behind the forward. For England, Rooney should therefore drop back from the lone forward role into a deeper position with Crouch leading the line. Frank Lampard is a further contender to join the advanced midfield trio. David Bentley, Shaun Wright-Phillips and Aaron Lennon provide additional options if an injection of pace is required.
In the second-half England switched to 4-4-2 (4-1-3-2) with Hargreaves now behind Barry in central midfield, and Peter Crouch and Michael Owen paired up front. The format of the second-half did not deviate greatly from the first. France were in control of the game more in the second period though, and were happy to hold on to a lead which they never looked like relinquishing. Whilst Barry had a sound first-half, he perhaps does not have enough about his game to be an effective advanced midfielder in a 4-4-2 at international level. Of the substitutes, Stewart Downing had a few bright moments on the left of midfield and Joleon Lescott appeared composed in central defence. The new attack had very little impact with Owen particularly ineffectual. If two forwards are played together in forthcoming fixtures, a partnership should be developed between Rooney and Crouch. And as highlighted above, whilst there was not a substantial difference between the two halves, I believe England looked more organized under 4-2-3-1 and any deficiencies should be addressed with this as the on-pitch template for future games.
Despite the 1-0 defeat it must be remembered that this was an away fixture against one of the strongest international teams.
Edward @ March 26, 2008
Retrospective
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One of England’s most famous victories is the 5-1 defeat of Germany in Munich on the road to World Cup 2002. Analysis of this historic victory may provide clues as to why England failed to live up to the expectation that this result generated. England adopted a 4-4-2 approach for what was anticipated to be a testing away fixture. Germany opted for a 3-5-2 system with wing-backs, but with Dietmar Hamann dropping deep from midfield this could be considered a 3-1-4-2 formation.
Central midfield
Perhaps the key focus of interest when scrutinising this fixture is the arrangement of England’s central midfield. The question of how England should divide the responsibilities of its central midfielders has persisted over recent years. Did England succeed in this game because distinct roles had been allocated to the two central midfielders? Review of this fixture suggests that a distinct positional brief had not been allocated to either player: whilst Paul Scholes and Steven Gerrard are usually considered to be attack-minded midfielders, both players adopted restrained defensive roles for this tricky away tie. Over the 90 minutes neither player adopted a markedly more advanced position than the other.
The build-up to Germany’s only goal of the game endorses the suspicion that there was not a clear demarcation of responsibilities between Gerrard and Scholes. In the early stages of the game, Germany made the most of their additional centrally-located personnel. Hamann strolled forwards from defence and played the ball to fellow midfielder Ballack; Ballack crossed for Neuville who nodded it into the path of his strike-partner Jancker. With England’s central midfield protecting the defence Hamann was able to initiate this successful attack without an advanced English midfielder placing him under any pressure. After the goal it was Emile Heskey, from his attacking berth, who was allocated the task of closing down the German players as they advanced from defence.
On the flanks
Nick Barmby had been allocated to, what was then, England’s problem role on the left of midfield. During this game Barmby kept things tight but offered very little going forwards. Likewise, David Beckham often drifted infield and offered little penetration down the right flank: however, it should be acknowledged that he was closely involved in three of the five England goals.
It is perhaps a surprise that the German wing-backs Rehmer and Bohme did not push forward more to test England’s full-backs. With Hamann dropping back as almost fourth defender at times, the three centre-backs should have been able to cover the space adequately if Beckham or Barmby had gone on the offensive. There was, therefore, an adequate defensive platform which should have allowed the wing-backs to eschew some defensive responsibilities. In fact, with German personnel focused on central areas (and with Rehmer and Bohme occupied with Beckham and Barmby) it was the full-backs Gary Neville and Ashley Cole who had the most attacking freedom. England’s success in this fixture, without any real attacking presence at wide-midfield, may have been a factor which prompted Sven Goran-Eriksson to experiment in later years with a more narrow diamond formation.
In conclusion
5-1 suggests an emphatic victory but many of the tactical frailties which bedevilled England over later years were actually apparent in this game. There was no clear division of labour in central midfield and, apart from sporadic flourishes from the full-backs, there was little cutting edge down the flanks. The first-half was evenly matched and both of England’s goals arose from set-pieces; in open play Michael Owen and Heskey were often detached from the withdrawn midfield. Germany also had several further chances to score; Deisler notably missed a sitter which would have put Germany back in front. England scored a third early in the second-half which greatly shaped the rest of the game. England now sat back to defend their advantage, with Heskey joining the deep-lying midfield on the edge of the penalty area. Despite applying pressure Germany failed to reduce the deficit, then England scored two breakaway goals within 10 minutes to inflate the score line.
England certainly deserved their victory, however, and were well set-up by Eriksson for a tight away fixture: they shut down Germany on the flanks and eventually came to grips with their extra man in central midfield. But 5-1 was the outcome of a rather fortunate sequence of events, rather than an accurate reflection of the victorious team’s superiority.
Edward @ March 24, 2008
England, Team Analytics
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England v France this Wednesday provides Fabio Capello with his second opportunity to put an England side through its paces. Capello will be seeking indicators as to which players should feature in the forthcoming World Cup qualifiers, and also clues as to which formation will optimize their abilities.
Against Switzerland, Capello sent England out as a 4-1-4-1 version of 4-5-1 with Gareth Barry playing behind Jermaine Jenas and Steven Gerrard in central midfield. As this fixture pits England against a stronger side, and is away from home, I believe that Capello should adjust this formation slightly and play two defensive midfielders under a 4-2-3-1 formation. This is an approach that Capello previously utilized at Real Madrid. Barry retains his place in the starting line-up and is joined at the base of midfield by Owen Hargreaves. Hargreaves’ Man Utd teammate Michael Carrick would have provided a further option for defensive midfield and may feel slightly aggrieved that he was not even named in the initial squad of 30. The advanced trio of midfielders is led by Frank Lampard who is flanked by David Bentley and Joe Cole. Bentley and Cole are both in fine form for their clubs; they also performed well against Switzerland so should be rewarded with places in the starting line-up. David Beckham can win his 100th cap from the bench.
There is also no place for Steven Gerrard in my XI. The Guardian’s Kevin McCarra suggested that the captaincy should reside elsewhere, after Gerrard’s provisional appointment against Switzerland, and argues that: “it would be best to excuse him those responsibilities in the hope that free rein is given to his explosive spontaneity”. However, it is doubtful that it was the temporary bestowal of captaincy that hindered Gerrard in the aforementioned game: explosive spontaneity has generally been absent from his England performances. He has been an England mainstay for seven years and has persistently disappointed at international level. Excuses must soon wear thin and we may discover under Capello whether Gerrard can make a useful contribution as an impact substitute.
Elsewhere within this formation, Wayne Rooney takes up the lone forward berth and looked sharp against Liverpool on Sunday. Michael Owen has intimated that he may be returning to form with Newcastle but he will not suit the lone forward role so is restricted to the bench. The defence almost picks itself, but Wes Brown is under pressure from Glen Johnson for the right-back slot.
Edward @ March 24, 2008
