Germany 1 England 5

Retrospective

One of England’s most famous victories is the 5-1 defeat of Germany in Munich on the road to World Cup 2002. Analysis of this historic victory may provide clues as to why England failed to live up to the expectation that this result generated. England adopted a 4-4-2 approach for what was anticipated to be a testing away fixture. Germany opted for a 3-5-2 system with wing-backs, but with Dietmar Hamann dropping deep from midfield this could be considered a 3-1-4-2 formation.

Central midfield
Perhaps the key focus of interest when scrutinising this fixture is the arrangement of England’s central midfield. The question of how England should divide the responsibilities of its central midfielders has persisted over recent years. Did England succeed in this game because distinct roles had been allocated to the two central midfielders? Review of this fixture suggests that a distinct positional brief had not been allocated to either player: whilst Paul Scholes and Steven Gerrard are usually considered to be attack-minded midfielders, both players adopted restrained defensive roles for this tricky away tie. Over the 90 minutes neither player adopted a markedly more advanced position than the other.

The build-up to Germany’s only goal of the game endorses the suspicion that there was not a clear demarcation of responsibilities between Gerrard and Scholes. In the early stages of the game, Germany made the most of their additional centrally-located personnel. Hamann strolled forwards from defence and played the ball to fellow midfielder Ballack; Ballack crossed for Neuville who nodded it into the path of his strike-partner Jancker. With England’s central midfield protecting the defence Hamann was able to initiate this successful attack without an advanced English midfielder placing him under any pressure. After the goal it was Emile Heskey, from his attacking berth, who was allocated the task of closing down the German players as they advanced from defence.

On the flanks
Nick Barmby had been allocated to, what was then, England’s problem role on the left of midfield. During this game Barmby kept things tight but offered very little going forwards. Likewise, David Beckham often drifted infield and offered little penetration down the right flank: however, it should be acknowledged that he was closely involved in three of the five England goals.

It is perhaps a surprise that the German wing-backs Rehmer and Bohme did not push forward more to test England’s full-backs. With Hamann dropping back as almost fourth defender at times, the three centre-backs should have been able to cover the space adequately if Beckham or Barmby had gone on the offensive. There was, therefore, an adequate defensive platform which should have allowed the wing-backs to eschew some defensive responsibilities. In fact, with German personnel focused on central areas (and with Rehmer and Bohme occupied with Beckham and Barmby) it was the full-backs Gary Neville and Ashley Cole who had the most attacking freedom. England’s success in this fixture, without any real attacking presence at wide-midfield, may have been a factor which prompted Sven Goran-Eriksson to experiment in later years with a more narrow diamond formation.

In conclusion
5-1 suggests an emphatic victory but many of the tactical frailties which bedevilled England over later years were actually apparent in this game. There was no clear division of labour in central midfield and, apart from sporadic flourishes from the full-backs, there was little cutting edge down the flanks. The first-half was evenly matched and both of England’s goals arose from set-pieces; in open play Michael Owen and Heskey were often detached from the withdrawn midfield. Germany also had several further chances to score; Deisler notably missed a sitter which would have put Germany back in front. England scored a third early in the second-half which greatly shaped the rest of the game. England now sat back to defend their advantage, with Heskey joining the deep-lying midfield on the edge of the penalty area. Despite applying pressure Germany failed to reduce the deficit, then England scored two breakaway goals within 10 minutes to inflate the score line.

England certainly deserved their victory, however, and were well set-up by Eriksson for a tight away fixture: they shut down Germany on the flanks and eventually came to grips with their extra man in central midfield. But 5-1 was the outcome of a rather fortunate sequence of events, rather than an accurate reflection of the victorious team’s superiority.

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Edward @ March 24, 2008